Who Supports Wealth Redistribution? Self-Interest, Symbolic Politics and American
Exceptionalism Approaches Towards 1990 Public Opinion

Abstract
Economic inequality has been significantly rising in the United States, making it the most
unequal advanced industrialized democracy. Understanding factors that influence public attitudes
towards inequality and potential remedies such as redistribution of wealth, gives a reference
point for tracking subsequent preference-policy links. This research utilizes survey data from the
1990 General Social Survey to explore factors influencing preferences towards redistribution as
gross wealth consolidation among the top 10% was only starting to remerge. Empirically
applying theories of economic self-interest, symbolic politics and American exceptionalism to
wealth redistribution preferences, the research finds economic self-interest as having the biggest
role in predicting attitudes.
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Introduction
Public opinion on economic inequality illuminates a key contradiction regarding the
ethos of the American Dream’s promise of opportunity for mobility, and the reality of relatively
fixed economic positions. This issue continues to generate public opinion salience on the role of
the government in reducing economic inequality as the United States progresses in an “age of
growing inequality” (Gilbert, 2015). While recent scholarship focuses on contemporary public
opinion regarding the morality of economic inequality and the role of government in reducing
the economic disparity, the focus of this paper is to analyze public opinion on a specific function
of the social welfare state - redistribution of wealth - at a time when economic inequality was
only beginning to intensify (Saez, 2014). Using public opinion data from 1990, this paper will
explore the impact of potential factors including economic self-interest, symbolic politics and
American exceptionalism on preferences towards wealth redistribution in the political context
following Ronald Reagan’s presidency. By examining public opinion on preferences for
redistribution during the conception of the 10% consolidation of wealth, I hope to cultivate a
fuller understanding on probable factors that affect attitudes towards wealth redistribution and
subsequently condoned the rise of income inequality following 1990 and beyond.

Literature Review
Fundamental tension in American values’ of freedom and equality makes the topic of
redistribution a highly politicized issue. Whereas public opinion on the social welfare state in
general has remained relatively stable from 1970 to 1980 (Shapiro and Young, 1989), current
attitudes towards redistribution are uniquely bimodal (Osberg and Smeeding 2016). Polarization
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towards wealth redistribution preferences specifically may escalate following 1980 as Reagan
era tax cuts further concentrated wealth among economic elites (Gilbert, 2015) skyrocketing
economic inequality (Saez, 2014). As the median income began to fall further below the mean in
the 1990s, an application of Allan Meltzer and Scott Richard’s theory (1981) would suggest
more generous attitudes towards redistribution as inequality grows.
Allan Meltzer and Scott Richard’s theory (1981) relates to overall public opinion support
for redistribution as a function of the macro environment of inequality, but also empirically links
the notion of self-interest in one’s position towards redistribution. Pulling many ideas from
Anthony Downs’ An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957), Meltzer and Richard argue that
attitudes towards redistribution are largely dependent on one’s own economic interest. As
rational choice theorists argue that individuals are primarily motivated by the desire to maximize
their own utility, preferences towards wealth redistribution is thus contingent on how the policy
would affect individual actors’ economic bottom line. There is ample support for the self-interest
understanding of redistribution preferences as self-interest can be easily deduced along class
lines, in which attitudes often follow (Meltzer and Richards 1981; Dion 2010; Shapiro and
Young 1989; McCarthy, Davis, Garand and Olson 2016). In addition to concrete class lines,
relative economic well-being has shown to have an effect on consciousness of inequality
(Newman, Johnston and Lown 2015) and redistribution preferences specifically (Meltzer and
Richard 1981; Luttig 2013; Kuziemko, Norton, Saez and Stantcheva 2015).
An alternative explanation for preferences towards redistribution is that of symbolic
politics. Rather than differences in redistribution emerging as only a function of class conflict,
there is literature suggesting a role of symbolic and identity politics (Shapiro and Young 1989).
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Ideological frameworks (liberal to conservative continuum) have been shown to significantly
impact one’s long standing preferences (Sears, Lau, Tyler and Allen 1980; McCarthy et al.
2016), as well as partisanship identity (democrat, republican). Individuals who express more
liberal belief systems and view themselves as Democrats have been shown to be more supportive
of redistributional policies than individuals indicating a conservative belief system and
identifying as Republicans (Frohlich and Boschmann 1986; Franko, Tolbert and Witko 2013;
McCarthy et al. 2016). Additionally, religiosity--but not religious affiliation--has a significant
effect on redistributional preferences. Specific interpretations of scripture in Christianity or
identifying as “religious right” has a negative relationship with support for redistribution
(McCarthy et al. 2016).
Other demographic aspects that are found in symbolic politics seem to have a role in
one’s preference for redistribution. There appears to be a strong positive effect for age (Dion
2010; McCarthy et al. 2016) and identifying as female (Dion 2010; McCarthy et al. 2016;
Frohlich and Boschmann 1986). Preferences for redistribution have been shown to share a
negative relationship with increase in educational attainment (Dion 2010). Racial and ethnic
identities have a strong influence over redistribution preferences, particularly as identifying as
black increases the likelihood of preferring wealth redistributions (McCarthy et al. 2016). The
racial influence of opinion towards redistribution could be traced to the racialization of the social
welfare state during the Reagan and Nixon administrations, particularly relevant for the 1990
data.
A Marxist perspective on an individual’s symbolic politics that clearly contradicts their
economic self-interest for redistribution can be argued as a form of false consciousness. The
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transmission of bourgeois’ ideology that manifests in symbolic politics could be seen as a tool to
control the lower classes and prevent them from voting for their best interest. As literature finds
that high socioeconomic status is strongly correlated with voting against redistribution which
clearly aligns with their economic self-interest, less correlation has been found among lower
class individuals with favoring redistribution (Dion 2010; Luttig 2013; Berinksy 2002).
However, when lower class individuals are educated on their self-interest, the level of support for
redistribution increases significantly (Kuziemko et al. 2015; Franko et al. 2013). Thus, when
respondents from lower socioeconomic status’ are exposed to their economic interest in regard to
redistribution, self-interest appears to play a larger role than originally anticipated.
The United States serves as an interesting level of analysis for public opinion on wealth
redistribution as it continues to be found as one of the most unequal industrialized countries
(Gilbert, 2015), yet many of the foundational beliefs of the United States are national myths of
meritocracy. In part due to defense of the ideology of the American Dream, a preliminary
question emerges on how Americans’ attitudes towards the function and morality of capitalism
and wealth concentration are constructed. Seymour Martin Lipset’s (1996) theory of “American
exceptionalism” has been historically applied to this to this question, in which he posits that
Americans are unique in they way they conceptualize inequality and mobility. In this theory,
values of freedom are highlighted over human decency in the function of a laissez-faire
economy. Morality of inequality, as understood in the framework of American exceptionalism, is
a crucial addition to the analysis in attitudes towards wealth redistribution. Perceived morality of
inequality has been found to be the biggest factor in redistributional preferences (Franko,
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Tolbert, and Witko 2013; McCarthy et al. 2016), which bolsters the salience of support or
opposition rooted in self-interest or symbolic politics.

Data and Methods
To test theories of self-interest, symbolic politics and American exceptionalism on
attitudes towards the government’s role to redistribute wealth, a multivariate ordinary least
squares regression was performed on data from the 1990 General Social Survey (GSS),
conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC). This data was gathered through
personal interviews with survey administrators and survey respondents on a variety of social,
political and economic issues. The independently drawn survey sample consisted of
English-speaking residents of the United States who were 18 years or older. Stratified
proportional probability was implemented in participant selection to ensure appropriate
representation of regions and urbanicity.
The dependent variable gauging preferences for wealth redistribution was measured
through the statement “It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in
income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes” on a 5 point Likert-type
scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Independent variables for self-interest’s influence
for redistribution was measured through the respondents’ occupational prestige score based off
of the NORC ratings, income, and perceived socioeconomic status when 16 and current family’s
level of income compared to “American families in general.” Symbolic politics influence on
redistribution was operationalized with questions regarding self-identification on the liberal to
conservative ideological continuum, partisanship, educational attainment, urbanicity when an
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adolescent, race, gender, region, religious affiliation and religiosity. Questions regarding
American exceptionalism attitudes towards inequality’s function and morality were additionally
included for analysis with 4 point Likert-style questions “Only if differences in income are large
enough is there an incentive for individual effort” labeled as function and “Personal income
should not be determined solely by one's work. Rather, everybody should get what he/she needs
to provide a decent life to his/her family,” labeled as morality.

Results
Overall, the distribution of preferences towards redistribution of wealth is fairly normally
distributed (mean = 3.07, median = 3, and mode = 4), resulting in a slightly negative skew (skew
= -.10). See Figure 1. The data analysis yielded support for self-interest, symbolic politics and
American exceptionalism influence on preferences towards redistribution. See Table 1. The
regressions suggest that the biggest predictors for pro-redistribution attitudes is actual and
relative income, liberal-conservative ideology, partisanship, age, urbanicity when adolescent,
education and believing that everyone has a right to a decent life.
The economic factors gauging the self-interest hypothesis towards wealth redistribution
attitudes suggest a significant effect, accounting for 7% of the variance in attitudes towards
redistribution. After including symbolic politics, occupational prestige rankings suggest a smaller
role as it may share variance with other factors such as education. Both actual and relative
income proved to be the biggest elements of self-interest in which support for redistribution
declines as both of those measures increase. Relative income provided the highest indicator of
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self-interest, suggesting a 0.17 point decrease in redistribution as relative income increases by 1
point. Relative income when an adolescent did not produce significant results.
The addition of symbolic politics to the self-interest model explains 5% more of the
variance in attitudes towards redistribution. Political ideology (liberal-conservative) and party
identification appeared to have the biggest impact under symbolic politics, as those who express
a more conservative political ideology and identify as republican are much less likely to support
wealth redistribution. Age also yielded significant results, as older people are less likely to
support redistribution compared to younger people. This trend is especially interesting as
previous studies have found an increase in age correlates positively towards redistribution
preferences (Dion 2010; McCarthy et al. 2016). This discrepancy with our analysis and previous
research could be contributed to cohort effects as the data for our analysis is from 1990.
Identifying as white had a significant interaction in the last regression, in which
identifying as white increases opposition towards redistribution by 0.27 points on a 5 point scale.
Identifying as black or another non-white race did not obtain significance, which is notable
considering the racialization of welfare policy during the 1980s and early 1990s. However, both
identifying as black or another non-white race trended in the expected direction of favoring
redistribution. An increase in education also yielded a significant result for decrease in
redistribution support. Contrary to literature, neither gender nor religiosity had significant results.
Interestingly, urbanicity when an adolescent yielded significant results as those who grew up in
more rural areas are more likely to support redistribution. The interaction of urbanicity as an
adolescent and later preferences towards redistribution suggest an influential role of political
context on urban or rural environments during one’s formative years.
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Ideals of American exceptionalism suggested the highest correlation in preferences
towards wealth redistribution. Interestingly, respondents who believed that inequality was
necessary to raise initiative, a common assumption under the ideology of American
exceptionalism regarding the function of capitalism, were not more likely to either significantly
support or oppose wealth redistribution. While function of inequality was not significantly
correlated with redistributional preferences, the morality of inequality was the most statistically
significant factor in understanding one’s preferences towards redistribution. The belief that
regardless of one’s initiative, everyone deserves the opportunity to “provide a decent life to
his/her family” yielded a 2.6 point increase on attitudes regarding redistribution. While highly
statistically significant, one should be careful in extrapolating causality from the morality of
inequality on preferences towards redistribution as the two questions are highly intertwined and
should be understood within the context of the funnel of causality in policy preferences (see
Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960). The underlying question between both of those
survey items could be capturing the same response in regard to ethics of inequality. The
inclusion of attitudes towards function and morality of inequality additionally explained 5%
more of the variance after self-interest and symbolic politics were included. All previously
mentioned variables explained 17.6% of the variance in attitudes towards redistribution of
wealth.

Discussion
Overall, the differences in preferences towards wealth redistribution seem to be a nexus
of both self-interest and symbolic politics, with economic self-interest accounting for slightly
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more of the variance in attitudes towards wealth redistribution. In addition to those two camps of
theories, the added morality of inequality as understood in the frame of American exceptionalism
provided the highest statistically significant insight into preferences of redistribution. All of the
factors accounted for less than 20% of the explained variance, leaving much of the variance in
preferences towards redistribution unexplained by factors included in my analysis.
While preferences towards redistribution of wealth can not be only understood as a
microcosm for class conflict, self-interest along class lines were the most concrete independent
factor in predicting attitudes. Symbolic politics did play a role in understanding support for
redistribution most notably with partisanship and ideological identification, and ideals of
American exceptionalism regarding morality of inequality contributed in perhaps increasing or
decreasing personal salience on the issue of redistribution.
As past research has suggested that lower income participants are less aware of their
self-interest with redistributional policies than high income participants (Meltzer and Richard
1981; Luttig 2013; Kuziemko, Norton, Saez and Stantcheva 2015), policy implications require
access to education and information regarding redistributive policies (such as the Estate tax) with
clear explanations of how implementation of the particular policy would impact different
socioeconomic brackets. If education of redistribution policies was disseminated with a
particular focus on lower income Americans, public opinion towards redistribution might more
accurately reflect the self-interest of the American class structure. After making education of
redistributional policies accessible, policy that corresponds with the public opinion should then
be implemented.
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As the United States continues to descend into the “age of growing inequality” (Gilbert
2015), it is necessary to pause and reflect on the roots of income and wealth consolidation that
can be found in the 1990s and assess the public opinion that has allowed the United States to
become the “most unequal rich country on earth” (Fishers and Smeeding 2016). Going forward,
specific focus on reducing economic inequality--either through wealth redistribution or other
facets of the social welfare state--should be considered and properly educated to the public in
order to restore the promise of the American Dream to the reality of the United States.

11

Figure 1. Distribution of preferences towards wealth redistribution in 1990 General Social
Survey.
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